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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report presents the latest insights into 
new ways of financing much needed 
affordable rental housing in Australia, 
especially by attracting large scale 
institutional investors into the field. It builds 
on 2012/13 research led by the City Futures 
Research Centre (UNSW) into prospects for 
such a direction, as informed by a high level 
panel of industry experts and policy makers. 
To update that research, this report revisits 
our previous findings, reviews recent 
domestic and international housing 
investment developments, and summarises 
insights and experiences generated from a 
new round of contacts with local experts.  
Engaging super funds, sovereign wealth funds 
and other large debt and equity investors in 
financing affordable housing is an often-
stated goal of governments looking for 
innovative ways to stimulate housing supply 
in straitened times. Advantages claimed for 
such an approach include: the potentially 
large volume of funds available; the scope for 
matching institutional investor requirements 
for steady cash flow returns (rather than 
capital gains prioritised by  individual 
investors) to a rental product offer; and 
stimulation of a professionally managed and 
more stable rental tenure that can meet the 
rising need for affordable housing. While 
interest in this objective has been evident in 
Australia for some time (underpinning the 
introduction of the 2008 National Rental 
Affordability Scheme (NRAS), for example), it 
has yet to be achieved.  
As highlighted in this report, Australia’s lack of 
recent progress in this realm contrasts with 
that of the UK in the same period. There, a 
variety of strategies – including public 
subsidies, leveraging existing assets, 
aggregation vehicles (e.g. The Housing 
Finance Corporation) and government 
guarantees for capital market financing of 
both market and affordable rental products – 
have been successfully combined to drive a 
switch from public funding and mortgage 
financing (both in short supply following the 
Global Financial Crisis) to institutional 
financing of social, affordable and market 
rental housing forms. 
Australian experts continue to cite four major 
barriers to affordable rental housing 
investment from large institutional players:  
 Lower yields than for competing 
investment options 
 A lack of industry knowledge of rental 
housing products and performance 
 The small scale and fragmented nature of 
deals on offer, coupled with insufficient 
liquidity, and  
 Changeable and uncertain or, in some 
instances, unsuitable government policy 
settings. 
Overcoming these barriers will call for 
concerted government action on each. While 
successfully attracting finance industry 
interest and evoking development of several 
possible financing models, Australia’s recent 
NRAS experience was problematic in that 
technical scheme design was ill-suited to 
institutional investor requirements, and the 
program’s 2014 demise arrested mounting 
market momentum and heightened industry 
concerns about policy risk. As well, insufficient 
time was allowed for expected market 
responses to develop. More fundamentally 
now, without a subsidy or incentive of some 
form, competitive yields on lower rent 
residential assets are not achievable. 
The recommendations arising from our latest 
investigation (listed below) propose a 
practicable way forward whereby Australian 
governments working closely with industry 
experts could re-engage with advancing a new 
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investment market in residential rental that, 
we argue, would have major benefits for the 
Australian economy and society.  
Recommendations 
1. Given the economic and social 
importance of boosting efficiently and 
effectively managed rental housing 
supply, Governments across Australia 
should recognise the untapped potential 
for large scale institutional investment in 
this sector. They should give priority to 
stimulating a new financing model to 
realise this prospect. 
2. A cross-sectoral Rental Investment Task 
Force of key stakeholders and experts 
with high level policy and financing 
credentials should be appointed to 
develop recommendations for achieving 
target levels of institutional investment in 
rental housing supply, including an 
element affordable to low and moderate 
income groups. 
3. An eminent private sector leader should 
be appointed to head the Rental 
Investment Task Force. 
4. To facilitate the supply of newly-
constructed affordable rental housing, a 
new incentive framework designed 
specifically for institutional players (and 
replacing the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme) should be 
developed for introduction by 2017. 
5. State Governments should assemble and 
offer an initial portfolio of suitable shovel 
ready sites for residential development 
by private and not-for-profit developers 
which, on letting, can be re-financed 
through large-scale institutional 
investment.  
6. State governments should offer a land 
tax waiver for aggregated rental holdings 
meeting designated regulatory 
requirements for affordable rental. 
 
 
 
 
7. Consideration should be given to the 
possible role of government guarantees 
in facilitating institutional investment in 
rental housing provision, to provide 
comfort to backers and, thus, to 
minimise cost of funds. 
8. An independent specialist financial 
intermediary, such as an Australian 
Housing Finance Corporation, should be 
founded.  
9. An existing or new agency should be 
resourced to collect, publish and 
maintain appropriate financial, asset and 
tenancy management information that 
will inform all industry parties about the 
state of the affordable housing industry 
and its development.  
10. Tax reform options to support 
institutional investment in social 
infrastructure including affordable 
housing should be investigated.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The need to grow 
affordable rental housing 
In Australia, as in many other developed 
countries, there is mounting concern about 
the large and growing shortage of housing 
affordable for households on low to moderate 
incomes (‘affordable housing’).1 The 
withdrawal of direct government investment 
in new supply, a long-term trend, necessitates 
greater reliance on the private sector. 
Australian experience has shown that the 
current private rental system, dominated by 
speculative small-scale individual investors, 
serves the top end of the rental market 
extremely well. However, the lower end of 
the rental market, where rental yields are 
relatively constant and secure over the long-
term, is likely to be better served by 
institutions prioritising long-term stable 
income returns rather than unpredictable 
capital gains. Yet, the long-held aspiration to 
reconnect institutional finance with rental 
housing has remained elusive (Pawson & 
Milligan 2013).  
Australia’s affordable rental housing shortage 
has been exacerbated by a long-term decline 
in the share of social rental housing, 
interrupted only briefly between 2008 and 
2012 due to Commonwealth Government 
initiatives in that period (see Milligan & 
Pinnegar 2010). Although only part of the 
affordable housing picture, at some 422,000 
dwellings, overall social housing provision in 
2013 (AIHW 2014) remained more than 
100,000 below the level needed to keep pace 
with post-1996 household growth (National 
                                                          
1 In this paper, affordable housing refers to rental 
housing that is priced within the means of low and 
moderate income households. This incudes but is not 
limited to social rental housing, which in Australia is 
targeted to high needs clients, and other forms of 
government supported and market rental housing. 
Housing Supply Council 2012). At the same 
time, while private rental provision has 
expanded ahead of the nation’s growing 
population, the total number of private rental 
dwellings affordable for low income 
households has declined. In conjunction with 
the way that existing stock is allocated in the 
private rental market, this has resulted in the 
shortage of private rental dwellings affordable 
and available to low income households 
growing to some 270,000 by 2011, up from 
150,000 in 1996 (Hulse et al. 2015). 
Due to these trends, growing numbers of 
lower income households are being 
effectively pushed into poverty by 
unaffordable housing costs. Across Australia, 
the proportion of lower income renters 
paying rents equating to more than half of 
household incomes rose from 20% in 2007/08 
to 25% in 2009/10. By 2009/10 60% were 
paying more than 30% of income in rent 
(National Housing Supply Council 2012). With 
rents having continued to run well ahead of 
general inflation for most of the past two 
decades, it seems highly unlikely that such 
trends will have reversed in more recent 
years. The costs borne by individual 
households due to poor housing affordability 
have been well documented.2 One such cost is 
that, in their search for more affordable 
housing, lower income households are pushed 
further into middle and outer suburban 
locations in our major cities, increasingly 
remote from job-rich inner cities and CBDs 
(Randolph & Tice 2014; Pawson & Herath 
2015).  
Both unaffordable housing and poorly located 
affordable housing are problematic for 
residents because of the pressures they place 
on individual household budgets and time 
availability. They are also problematic for 
society as a whole since they impair both 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Yates and Milligan 2007 
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national economic efficiency and 
competitiveness (Rawnsley & Spiller 2012) 
and risk further eroding the social contract 
around fairness and opportunity. 
With declining budget capacity, governments 
face a difficult task in responding to such 
challenges. However, with appropriate 
government support there is a market 
opportunity for the finance sector to invest in 
rental housing. Thus, as discussed in greater 
depth in our 2013 reports (referenced below), 
a number of developments have recently 
created more favourable conditions for 
investment industry interest: 
 The demographically-driven transition of 
some superannuation funds from the 
‘accumulation phase’ to the ‘pension 
phase’ in which more reliable (if lower 
yielding) investments assume greater 
priority. 
 The post-GFC finance sector recognition 
of the need to maximise portfolio 
diversification, especially through 
engagement with an investment class 
characterised by cycles differing from 
other types of asset. 
 Investing institutions’ appreciation that 
residential rental returns tend to rise in 
line with earnings, thus often matching 
funds’ long-term liabilities. 
If adequately underpinned by state assistance 
this could include affordable housing. This 
would involve facilitating large-scale 
institutional investment supported by 
government subsidies and/or credit 
enhancements in return for resulting 
tenancies being made available to qualifying 
households at below-market rents. This is, 
indeed, what the 2008 National Rental 
Affordability Scheme (NRAS) was intended to 
achieve. However, for reasons explored in this 
report, the Scheme’s objectives were not fully 
realised.  
Building on an already substantial body of 
research to which we have contributed, this 
report considers the changing prospects for 
securing large-scale, long-term financing of 
rental housing in general and affordable 
rental housing in particular. 
1.2 Research purpose and 
methods  
Both in Australia and elsewhere, the scope for 
institutional financing of (affordable) rental 
housing has been extensively discussed over 
the past 10-20 years. However, the specific 
starting point for the current study was the 
2012 investigation on the topic progressed via 
an industry and policymaker panel facilitated 
by the current authors and funded by the 
Australian Housing and Urban Research 
Institute (AHURI). Two resulting reports were 
published (Milligan et al. 2013a, 2013b). Box 1 
summarises the four major barriers to 
progress identified by this expert panel, 
together with the mitigating strategies and 
actions proposed at that time to address 
these. Unfortunately, despite strong backing 
from research participant stakeholders 
(including government officials), these have 
yet to evoke any substantial government 
response. 
A follow up research project was conducted 
by City Futures researchers in 2014/15 to 
update our earlier findings in the light of 
significant post-2012 policy and market 
changes. This update benefited from a 
substantial contribution by Professor Peter 
Williams, one of the UK’s leading experts on 
the subject.  
In this report the findings of this ‘follow up’ 
project are presented in three main sections. 
First we highlight post-2012 developments in 
policy and market conditions and discuss their 
implications for the potential for enlarging 
institutional investment in rental housing. This 
 
 
7 
 
includes an update on relevant UK 
developments. Second, we present the latest 
industry insights into ways to address the 
persisting critical domestic barriers to 
institutional investment. Finally, we discuss 
possible policy directions and detail 
recommendations.  
The report draws on interviews and 
roundtables involving a wide range of industry 
stakeholders, policymakers and other experts. 
Participants included: 
 Commonwealth and state (NSW and 
Victoria) government officials 
 Finance industry professionals 
 Expert consultants and lobbyists. 
In all, 15 participants were involved via in-
depth interviews and 39 attended roundtable 
events convened by the research team. In 
addition, the report is informed by a review of 
recently published policy and academic 
literature on housing finance.  
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BOX 1: FINDINGS OF 2012 INVESTIGATION INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING* 
Key barriers  Strategies as proposed in 2012/13 
Risk return 
 Secure and predictable returns 
commensurate with alternative investment 
options are required. 
 Basing return on rents not capital growth will 
be preferable to institutional investors.  
 Risk and perceived risk increase yield 
requirements, which works against 
affordability.  
 Encourage development of an infrastructure-
style rental housing product with return 
determined solely by cash flows from rental 
revenue (avoids development risk). 
 Offer a government equity component (e.g. 
land)  
 Maintain a financial incentive (such as NRAS) 
to meet yield requirements and achieve 
affordability goals. 
Novelty 
 Pooled residential funds are an unknown 
asset class. Market growth will require 
development of a robust track record on the 
performance of rental assets, tenancy 
managers and pooled instruments. 
 Embark on a proof-of-concept phase (2-3 
years) to develop the investment market, 
with government support.  
 Offer credit support (e.g. revenue guarantee) 
and manage tenancy risks to encourage 
industry start up and overcome major 
perceived risks. 
Scale and liquidity 
 Large investors require large and diversified 
deals in tradeable products. Deal sizes of 
$50m to $250m for an institution and at least 
$500m p.a. in aggregate would be expected 
to create liquidity and establish a sustainable 
market. 
 Consider specialised intermediaries to 
aggregate investment options. 
 Support development of secondary market 
mechanisms–e.g. bonds, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts.  
 Set rental supply targets (see below) to meet 
scale requirements – including both 
affordable (assisted) and market rental 
components.  
 Assemble rental investment opportunities 
across jurisdictions (especially in view of 
small Australian market). 
Policy risk 
 Long-term, robust commitments are 
expected from government. The possibility of 
investors being left with an “orphaned asset” 
(an isolated type of investment vehicle with 
little hope of further investment or liquidity 
if government support ceased) was identified 
as a serious concern.  
 Establish a long-term National Strategic 
Policy Framework for private investment in 
affordable housing. 
 Appoint a high level cross sectoral Task Force 
to steer development of the strategy. 
 Nominate annual affordable housing supply 
targets commensurate with housing needs 
and investor scale requirements and align 
commitments to government incentives with 
the targets. 
 
*The investigation considered the key barriers to investment in rental housing and devised a package of 
responsive strategies. The 23 panel participants included senior public officials, banking and superannuation 
industry experts and housing industry specialists.  
Source: Milligan et al. 2013a  
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POST-2012 INVESTMENT 
CONTEXT  
2.1  Housing policy 
developments  
For many years Australian governments have 
voiced interest in stimulating investment of 
larger scale private capital from new and 
diverse sources into affordable housing. In 
particular, the desire for involvement of larger 
financial institutions has been stressed.3 
Since the 2012 AHURI study the policy context 
for housing investment has changed in several 
important ways with implications for investor 
appetite and decision making, as discussed 
below.  
2.1.1  Cessation of the National 
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) 
NRAS was Australia’s 2008 national ground-
breaking program designed to incentivise 
private investment in newly constructed 
affordable rental housing through an annual 
tax credit offered to private investors for ten 
years. At introduction NRAS was marketed 
strongly as an incentive for institutional 
investors that, if effective, would be expanded 
to 100,000 affordable rental dwellings from its 
initial target of 50,000 after 2012/13.4 
Conceptually, the scheme was loosely based 
on the long-established and successful US Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit program. Its 
specific features were adapted from the 
National Rental Affordability Incentive (NARI) 
model, developed outside of government by a 
coalition of housing industry and community 
                                                          
3 See for example, Housing Ministers Conference (2009) 
‘Implementing the National Housing Reforms: A 
Progress Report to the Council of Australian 
Governments from Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Housing Ministers’. 
4Plibersek, T. (2008) National Rental Affordability 
Scheme Bill 2008, Second reading speech, House of 
Representatives Hansard, September 24  
sector organisations prior to the 2007 Federal 
Election.5 As it emerged under the post-2007 
Australian Government, however, NRAS 
departed from NARI in several major ways 
that arguably damaged its appeal to 
institutional investors, which we discuss 
further below (see Section 3.5 and Box 3).  
At its inception, NRAS received broad-based 
backing from across the political spectrum. 
Scheme advocates recognised that to secure 
institutional investor commitment a medium 
to long-term approach would be essential.6 In 
2014, however, the program was capped at a 
maximum of about 38,000 affordable rental 
dwellings. By that time it had successfully 
stimulated nearly 22,000 new builds owned 
by small-scale investors (including family 
trusts and self-managed super funds) and not-
for-profits, but it had yet to attract 
institutional finance (Australian Government 
2014a; project interviews). However, several 
leading banks and superannuation funds had 
shown more than a passing interest in the 
scheme and claim to have developed 
workable models.7 It is also understood (from 
                                                          
5 The National Affordable Housing Summit operated 
from 2004-2011 (Milligan & Tiernan 2011). Detailed 
consultation, modelling and design activities were 
conducted by this group over several years prior to 
finalisation of the NARI proposal for public release in 
2007. These consultations included extensive 
discussions with major financial institutions, developers 
and governments, as well as with housing providers, 
residents and academic experts. 
6 See, for example, the 2008 Senate Standing Committee 
on Community Affairs Inquiry into Bills to establish the 
scheme – viz. the National Rental Affordability Scheme 
Bill 2008 and the National Rental Affordability Scheme 
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2008. 
7 Milligan et al. (2013a:30-36) describes the emerging 
investment market and prospective models partly 
stimulated by NRAS. One product, the GRAIL 
(Government Rental Affordability Indexed Linked) 
Income Fund, described in that report (p. 34) went to 
market in 2013 offering an indicative annual return to 
investors of CPI plus 5%. Marketing confirmed that this 
product suited super funds’ preferences for an index-
linked payment (for debt finance) and that they were 
attracted to an option that avoided property risk. 
However, negotiations with super funds broke down 
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industry sources) that funding applications by 
domestic and international institutional 
investors were among those in ‘Round 5’ – 
the May 2013 call for applications that was 
terminated due to budgetary cut-backs under 
the new Coalition Government following the 
September 2013 Federal election. 
2.1.2 State government initiatives  
New initiatives in the housing realm with 
potential to attract private finance at scale 
have emanated from individual states, notably 
Queensland and NSW.8  In particular, the 
Queensland Government’s ‘Logan renewal 
plan’ and prospective NSW Premier’s 
Innovation Initiative have attracted industry 
scrutiny. The former involves transfer of the 
management of nearly 5,000 public housing 
dwellings in Logan City to a community 
housing provider (CHP) from mid-2015 and 
rolling redevelopment of some of the 
transferred sites to provide an additional 
1,500 social and affordable rental dwellings. 
Originally, to attract investor interest, the 
Logan transfer was designated as the first of a 
5-year program of transfers involving over 
90% of public housing in Queensland (45,000 
dwellings in addition to the Logan tranche) 
(Pawson et al. 2013). However, the 2015 
change of government in Queensland may put 
this program in doubt. While private sector 
engagement with the Logan project was 
restrained9 and financing of the 
redevelopment component is yet to be 
arranged, schemes of this type are recognised 
in the industry as offering some potential for 
                                                                                    
over the cost of intermediary fees (Interview investment 
intermediary). 
8 While this study did not cover Western Australia, 
under the WA Government’s affordable housing 
framework there have been some promising 
developments. Of most relevance, is the exploration of 
alternative financing structures and investment 
products, such housing bonds and tradable instruments, 
with the potential to attract institutional investment.  
9 The winning bid team involved not-for-profit 
organisations only. One other competing bid remained 
at the end of the bid process.  
institutional investors, not least because of 
the scale of the requirement underpinned by 
strong government backing.  
The NSW Premier’s Innovation Initiative 
concerns an Expression of Interest (EOI) 
process underway at the time of writing and 
(inter alia) calling for financing innovations to 
assist with social housing modernisation and 
new supply. Initiated by the NSW Department 
of Premier and Cabinet, this initiative is 
centred on ‘sweating existing assets’ rather 
than offering new government investment. 
Indeed, proponents were directed to propose 
innovations that represented no cost to 
government. Nevertheless, in what will be 
seen as an encouraging development from an 
industry perspective,10 the NSW Government 
has signalled that it is:  
…open to considering the provision of credit 
enhancements to assist with securing third 
party capital on competitive terms provided 
the application is considerate of the impact 
such credit enhancements would have on the 
State’s balance sheet and/or credit rating. 
(NSW Government 2014: 3).11  
 
Importantly to considerations of scale and 
durability, in the evaluation of bids made 
under the Initiative, preference will be given 
to innovations capable of wider application – 
e.g. in other geographic locations or segments 
of the market (NSW Government 2014: 9).  
2.1.3 National Disability Insurance 
Scheme  
Beyond these specific state plans, the new 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) 
may also offer potential for new investment 
                                                          
10 See also Milligan et al. (2013b: 16-19) and Lawson et 
al. (2014) for discussion of the role and potential for 
government guarantees  
11 The term ‘credit enhancement’ refers to ways that 
government can facilitate the commitment of private 
finance – e.g. through debt repayment guarantees or 
balance sheet support.  
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models. NDIS is an innovative seven-year 
funded national program (commenced in 
2013) to provide individualised support for 
people with permanent and significant 
disability, their families and carers. Under the 
scheme, the housing needs of clients will be 
addressed through a combination of referrals 
to existing programs and services (such as 
public and community housing, rent 
assistance and NRAS dwellings), family 
investment and a dedicated stream of funding 
for accommodation, including retrofitting, 
that is scheduled to flow from 2015/16 and is 
expected to reach $700m per annum by 
2018/19. There are aims to leverage this 
public funding (partly sourced from a levy on 
taxpayers) two to threefold by taking 
advantage of the cash flows it will generate 
(Bonyhady 2014). Family equity is likely to be 
a major source of private funds. However, 
pooling of housing payments to individuals to 
create scalable investment opportunities 
could create the conditions for attracting 
institutional investment. Further guidance on 
investment opportunities and options was 
expected in mid-2014 but has been deferred 
by the Commonwealth. 
2.1.4  Commencement of national 
regulation of community housing 
organisations 
Allocating management of affordable housing 
owned by both public and private investors to 
regulated arm’s length not-for-profit 
organisations has been a growing 
international trend also ramping up in 
Australia (Pawson et al. 2013). In keeping with 
investment industry expectations, a National 
Regulatory System for Community Housing 
(NRSCH) began operating in 2014. This offers 
a uniform system of regulation of housing 
not-for-profits and facilitates their cross-
jurisdictional operation.12 Importantly for the 
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, two jurisdictions (Victoria and Western 
Australia) are not currently participating in the NRSCH, 
institutional investment sector, regulation 
assists with giving assurance about, and 
reduces risk associated with, how residential 
assets are managed. Further involving finance 
industry representatives in the NRSCH’s 
development will be desirable to ensure that 
the regulatory model continues to provide 
them with adequate assurance of high quality 
financial, property and tenancy management. 
2.1.5 Prospective policy 
developments 
There are a number of extant areas of policy 
development with the potential to impact on 
the attractiveness of institutional investment 
in rental housing.  
One critical area concerns welfare reform and, 
in particular, the future of Rent Assistance 
payments (RA) to lower income tenants. RA 
boosts affordable housing revenue streams 
and hence underpins landlord returns. A 
February 2015 report of a major review of the 
welfare system (‘the McClure review of 
Australia’s welfare system’) recommended 
wide ranging changes to welfare payments, 
including changes to RA, which will be 
considered by the Australian Government in 
the context of the 2015 Budget. Assessment 
of welfare payment changes from the 
perspective of how these could impact 
government ambitions for private investment 
in affordable housing will be crucial.  
Another contemporary policy discussion with 
potential implications for the pathway for 
institutional investment in rental housing 
concerns the future designation of housing 
policy roles and responsibilities between the 
Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories. Along with other expenditure 
areas, this will be considered in the 
forthcoming White Paper: Reform of the 
                                                                                    
although they have indicated an intention to operate 
compatible state-based systems. 
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Federation (Australian Government 2014b). 
Prospectively, the closely aligned White Paper 
on the Reform of Australia’s Tax System will 
also have a vital bearing on future housing 
investment patterns. The release of the terms 
of reference for that review was imminent at 
the time of writing. 
A set of six principles will guide decision 
making on the future of government housing 
assistance within the context of the White 
Paper on Federation. One of these 
principles, 13 ‘national interest considerations’ 
– such that ‘where it is appropriate, a national 
approach is adopted in preference to diversity 
across jurisdictions’ (Australian Government 
2014b: 2) – will be especially relevant to the 
future of institutional investment. As 
evidenced previously and reiterated in this 
study, our research points strongly to the 
need to: 
 Promote a national market for 
investment in a residential asset class, 
especially to achieve scale and spread 
risk, and  
 Achieve (cross jurisdictional) policy 
consistency (especially taxation) to drive 
market efficiency.  
Finally, due to report in mid-April 2015, the 
Australian Senate Economics References 
Committee Inquiry into Affordable Housing 
has been examining many aspects of 
affordable housing policy, including the role 
for ‘innovative and responsible funding 
mechanisms that provide a stable and cost 
effective way of funding affordable rental and 
social housing, such as affordable housing 
supply bonds and an affordable housing 
finance corporation.’ 
                                                          
13 The other five guiding principles are: accountability 
for outcomes; subsidiarity; efficiency equity and 
effectiveness of service delivery; durability; and fiscal 
sustainability.  
2.2 Market conditions  
2.2.1 The changing context for 
housing investment 
Since the 2012 study the economic context for 
housing investment has changed in several 
important ways likely to affect investor 
appetite and decision making.  
House prices have increased steadily since 
2012, particularly in the larger capital cities, 
and private residential commencements, 
driven primarily by approvals for higher 
density dwellings, have returned to levels not 
seen for well over a decade. In part, these 
outcomes reflect mortgage lending rates 
which, since 2012, have declined to 50-year 
lows. Since rental growth has been more 
muted, such trends have damaged rental 
returns, evoking fund manager concerns: 
You pick up the paper every day and it tells 
you you’ve got the most expensive housing 
market in the world (interview, investment 
manager super fund).  
The associated acceleration of the rate of 
growth of credit to individual investors has led 
the Reserve Bank Governor to suggest that it 
‘should prompt a reasonable observer to ask 
the question whether some people might be 
starting to get just a little overexcited’ and to 
contemplate ‘focused action to help ensure 
sound standards ...that might lean into the 
price dynamic’.14 Such an approach is seen as 
an attempt to stretch out the upswing rather 
than constrain construction activity (Stephens 
2014: 5). 
Debt-financed small landlord investment 
through self-managed super funds (SMSFs) 
                                                          
14 At the end of 2014, the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) announced its intention to 
increase its supervisory intensity of Authorised Deposit 
Taking Intermediaries (ADIs) in the area of mortgage 
lending with a particular focus on the very strong growth 
in investor lending. 
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has also grown at an unprecedented rate in 
response to changes that have enhanced the 
financial appeal of property investment and as 
a result of relaxed constraints on borrowing 
against superannuation accounts.15 Such 
provisions put industry and retail super funds 
at a disadvantage because they cannot 
negatively gear their investments. Concerns 
about the growth of SMSF residential 
investments have led to calls for regulatory 
changes to limit the associated risks, 
recognising the capacity for house prices to 
fall as well as to rise. The 2014 Murray report 
on the financial system, for example, as well 
as calling for a removal of tax breaks that 
encouraged speculative investment in 
housing, recommended that all super funds 
be banned from borrowing (FSI 2014: 74).  
Increased rental property investment is also 
likely to have contributed to a slow-down in 
real rental growth after a decade or more of 
relatively strong upward movement. This, in 
conjunction with house price inflation, has 
contributed to declining rental yields since 
2012. 
The slowdown in rental growth also is likely to 
have been influenced by the impact on lower 
income renter households of post-2012 
below-trend economic growth and negative 
growth in real net national disposable income 
per capita. Unemployment has increased and 
wage growth has fallen, both of which have 
contributed to a decline in the growth in real 
household disposable incomes for lower 
income households. These have been 
exacerbated by reductions in some social 
security payments. 
Discussions with industry participants suggest 
these economic trends are likely to have had 
little impact on their overall appetite for 
residential rental investment (although in part 
                                                          
15 See, for example, RBA Financial Stability Review, 
September 2013: 54-57. 
this is always relative to what returns might 
be achieved in other sectors). The recorded 
upsurge in rental investment by individuals 
(and SMSFs) reflects an increased demand for 
the larger multi-unit developments that are 
preferred by those who contract out the 
management of their investment property. 
The sensitivity of such investment in rental 
housing to anticipated capital gains, the 
probability that house price growth will 
eventually slow and the uncertainties 
surrounding tax and financing arrangements 
for such investment raise questions about its 
reliability as a source of funding into the 
future. The potential volatility of funding from 
individual investors and its observed failure to 
deliver affordable housing for lower income 
households highlights the need for a new 
source of funding less reliant on speculative 
motives. As reported below, there is growing 
finance industry recognition of the potential 
for institutional investors to provide such 
funding. 
2.2.2 Lending for affordable housing 
in Australia 
Unlike in other countries such as the UK, data 
on lending for affordable housing in Australia 
is hard to come by. 16  Lawson et al. (2014: 29-
36) provide an overview of domestic lending 
arrangements current at the start of 2014. 
They reported growing lending into the 
affordable housing sector via the banking 
industry, involving the four large Australian 
banks and several second tier banking 
institutions. Nevertheless, sub-optimal and 
relatively immature lending practices – 
characterised by traditional bank debt at 
margins above standard mortgage interest 
rates, short loan terms (and hence mounting 
refinancing risk and cost) and one off, 
                                                          
16 For example, The Homes and Communities Agency 
publishes a quarterly survey setting out the amount of 
borrowing registered providers (not-for-profit housing 
associations) have taken and finance sources.  
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fragmented and lengthy fund raising 
processes – were the norm.  
In October 2014, reputedly the largest deal 
for debt funding into the sector to date, which 
took three years to finalise, was announced 
by Westpac Institutional Bank: a $61m loan 
facility to SGCH Ltd, a large NSW-based 
community housing provider, for the 
development of 275 new homes. This deal 
involves the bank financing developments by 
a newly created special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
on a renewable three year term. The lending 
is cash flow and non-recourse based, and has 
backing from the NSW Land and Housing 
Corporation (LAHC).17 The loan is also 
supported by security held over both existing 
and new assets vested in the SPV.  
As reported in our previous study, (Milligan et 
al. 2013a: 35) a collective of eight larger 
Australian community housing providers 
(CHPs) is in continuing negotiation with a 
banking institution and an intermediary to 
develop a residential asset-backed bond for 
their industry. However, the termination of 
NRAS was a major setback for this initiative. 
Consequently, public housing asset transfers 
to CHP balance sheets and/or other forms of 
credit support will be essential pre-conditions 
for such an initiative (interview, banking 
intermediary official). Confirming that 
financing arrangements are crucial, Australia’s 
leading CHPs have identified a lack of large-
scale structured financing and associated 
institutional support as the main factors 
constraining their sector’s potential to 
emulate international success in affordable 
housing production (Milligan et al. 2015).  
                                                          
17 The terms of LAHC backing are set out in a tripartite 
deed of agreement. They include an orderly process for 
relocating tenants before any foreclosure move, which 
aims to address a key investor concern about 
reputational risk arising from eviction of tenants. 
2.3 International experience 
As many Western governments have reduced 
their direct investment in housing provision, 
additional measures have been widely 
adopted to reduce the impact of that change. 
These also complement other continuing 
forms of public policy support for affordable 
housing such as: rent assistance/housing 
benefit, government land provision, ‘soft’ 
public loans, guarantees, and planning policy 
support.  
The primary and interconnected rationales for 
the widespread development of so-called 
‘innovative financing measures’ are derived 
from aims to: 
 Reduce direct public expenditure 
 Mobilise the very evident capacity of the 
private market, increase the volume of 
funds available and promote fund-raising 
efficiency 
 Create a long-term market in tradeable 
investment (liquidity) in residential assets 
 Reduce the cost of funds through 
lowering risk profiles, real or perceived, 
and 
 Create a competitive and sustainable 
market in residential investment 
(drawing on multiple – debt & equity – 
sources of funding, both national and 
international).  
Longer term investment in rental housing by 
arm’s length investors may also have flow-on 
benefits for investors and consumers, 
including fostering professional tenancy 
management firms and providing greater 
tenant stability (than occurs when investors 
are motivated partly by realisation of 
opportunistic capital gains) (Crook & Kemp 
2011). 
Some of the measures in this realm, such as 
the US Low Income Housing Tax Credit are 
long established and remain operational, 
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proving their durability. Others are more 
recent having been designed specifically for 
the post-GFC financial environment. Previous 
AHURI-funded research provides a 
consolidated record of relevant international 
financing initiatives judged potentially 
adaptable to the Australian context.18 In a 
recent international review of innovative 
financing of affordable housing, the Australian 
NRAS initiative was one of the six schemes 
selected as having potential applicability in 
the UK (Gibb et al. 2013). NRAS features 
highlighted as desirable included: the scale on 
offer; having a competitive subsidy (among 
different investor classes); and the flexibility 
engendered through allocations to both low 
and moderate income groups.  
2.3.1 Recent UK developments 
As highlighted in our previous study19 and by 
Professor Williams in presentations made 
during his recent Australian visit, the UK in 
particular has seen mounting interest in 
generating an institutionally financed rental 
sector. A flurry of parliamentary, government, 
industry and academic reports attests to this20 
along with specific government initiatives,21 
                                                          
18 See especially Lawson et al. (2010; 2012; 2014); 
Lawson (2013) and Milligan et al. (2013b) 
19 See Milligan et al. (2013b:20-26)  
20 Prominent among recent independent reports 
promoting new financing options are: 
 Lloyds Banking Group (2015) Report of the 
Lloyds Banking Group Commission on Housing  
 Legal and General (2014) Let’s House Britain, UK 
Housing Crisis Report 2014, Legal and General, 
London  
 KPMG in partnership with Shelter (2014) 
Building the homes we need: A Programme for 
the 2015 Government; London: KPMG  
 Scanlon, K., Whitehead, C., Williams, P. & Gibb, 
K. (2013) Building the Rented Sector in Scotland, 
Homes for Scotland, Edinburgh  
 The Montague Report (2012) Review of the 
barriers to institutional investment in private 
rented homes, London: Department of 
Communities and Local Government 
21 A summary of UK government’s initiatives can be 
found in Wilson (2014). As further background see 
Williams et al. (2011) 
as highlighted in Box 2. All of these reports, 
developed by a cross-section of stakeholders 
(substantially from the private sector), have a 
common focus on the need for institutional 
financing to stimulate new rental housing 
supply. This is seen as having the potential to 
provide substantial long-term housing 
funding, with a good match between inflation-
linked rents and the payments due on the 
pensions these funders provide. Many such 
institutions already have exposure to UK 
housing via housing association bond finance 
and private placements and this is now being 
extended with equity investment (Milligan et 
al. 2013b). The expectation is that this will 
continue to grow.22  
Industry-led initiatives 
Largely independent of government moves to 
promote such investment (see Box 2), the 
past few years have seen a growing range of 
‘build to rent’ projects involving 
collaborations between larger housing 
associations and institutional players to 
develop market rental accommodation at 
scale. Participating associations have included 
Genesis, L&Q Group, Notting Hill, Places for 
People, Sovereign and Thames Valley Housing 
(TVH). Prominent among investor partners 
have been Aviva, Legal and General and M&G 
Investments.23  
                                                                                    
 
22 In the most recent deal, Legal and General has 
announced its first investment in the UK Private Rental 
Sector (PRS) market and plans to become a major owner 
of rented accommodation; seeing it as an ideal new 
institutional asset class for long term investors, and with 
an appetite to invest up to £1bn in the sector.  Legal & 
General Capital (LGC), the principal investment division 
of the Group, has acquired an initial £25m regeneration 
site at Walthamstow in London to build and rent over 
300 flats.  
23 Projects involving these players are extensively 
reported in the UK journals ‘Inside Housing’ and ‘Social 
Housing’. Among initiatives additional to collaborations 
involving institutional entities and housing associations 
has been the recent Countrywide/Hermes 
announcement of a PRS investment fund. 
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Launched in 2012 and planned to involve the 
development of 1,000 market rental homes in 
and around London over three years, Thames 
Valley Housing’s Fizzy Living project is a 
collaboration between this West London-
based housing association and the sovereign 
wealth fund of Abu Dhabi, projected as 
generating a 5% net yield.24 All profits are 
earmarked to cross-subsidise affordable 
housing which remains TVH’s main business 
(Reeves 2014). 
Among the other housing association-
institutional investor collaborative models, 
which are now proven concepts, is the 
arrangement where an association initially 
funds and develops a project, with an 
institutional entity being engaged to refinance 
the scheme upon practical completion, 
acquiring the freehold property equity but 
leasing it back to the association which then 
functions as the long term manager (see 
Pawson & Milligan 2013).  
It should be emphasised that the 
collaborations cited above relate to market 
rental products rather than affordable 
housing. While possibly benefiting from scale 
efficiencies in procurement and/or 
management, they are essentially 
unsubsidised projects, developed without any 
significant government assistance. Adapting 
models of the kinds referenced above to 
generate affordable housing would of course 
normally require significant government 
subsidy and/or credit enhancement.25 
However, they highlight the potential to 
separate ownership from management and 
                                                          
24 Source: Riding the wave? Grant, profit and the future 
of housing associations in England; the case of Fizzy 
Living; UNSW seminar presentation by Peter Williams, 
22 October 2014 
25 2013 changes to NRAS rules had triggered the 
emergence of for-profit / not-for-profit collaborations 
supplying affordable housing in Australia but their 
further development has been impeded by the 
cancellation of that scheme (Milligan et al. 2015: 25). 
help providers to avoid locking up capital 
which can be usefully employed undertaking 
more development.  
Given their very large size and financially 
robust status, the UK housing associations 
engaged in market rental schemes are also 
incomparable with Australia’s still fairly small 
and typically asset-poor community housing 
organisations (true of even the largest 
operators). However, while lacking the asset-
backed capacity to raise development finance 
enjoyed by such UK counterparts, Australian 
CHPs are developing a strong housing 
management track record, potentially 
equipping them to play the scheme 
management role in equivalent 
collaborations. Indeed, post 2012 several of 
the larger CHPs entered into ’fee-for-service’ 
management arrangements with NRAS 
investors (Milligan et al. 2015). 
The UK ‘build to rent’ projects in which 
housing associations play a leading role are, it 
must be acknowledged, of indirect rather than 
direct relevance to affordable housing 
provision in Australia. The recent emergence 
of such projects nevertheless demonstrates 
the practical feasibility of institutionally 
financed new build rental housing developed 
at scale (e.g. in terms of generating 
acceptable rates of return), as well as 
illustrating the real appetite for such 
involvement among diverse types of 
institutional entities.
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BOX 2: RECENT UK POLICY AND INDUSTRY INITIATIVES TO ATTRACT PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Initiative  Purpose  Impact 
UK private rental 
and affordable 
housing debt 
guarantees 2013 
Under the UK-wide Housing Guarantee Schemes, the UK Government 
provides a guarantee to support debt raised by borrowers to develop 
additional affordable and market rental housing. There are separate 
guarantee schemes for affordable housing and market rental projects. The 
maximum value of guarantees across both schemes is £10billion, of which 
each has been allocated £3.5bn initially, with £3.0bn held in reserve. 
The schemes aim to attract investors seeking a stable long-term return on 
debt finance without exposure to residential property risk.  
In 2013 a delivery partner, The Housing Finance Corporation Limited (THFC) 
was appointed as operational manager of the Affordable Housing Guarantee 
Program (AGHP).  
Effectively that scheme is using the government’s fiscal credibility to reduce 
the cost of borrowing for housing providers 
Announced In January 2014, the first deal involved £500m investment, 
secured through an agreement with the European Investment Bank, to 
deliver up to 4,300 new affordable rental homes26  
Conditions included: 
 Minimum loan size £5million.  
 Minimum property security value not less than 115% of the loan on 
an Existing Use Value-Social Housing (EUV-SH) basis.  
 Net Annual Income from charged security not less than 100% of 
annual interest payable on the loan.  
 An annual administration fee equal to 0.10% (indexed) of the loan 
amount.  
Subsequently an inaugural AGHP £208m government-guaranteed bond 
issuance achieved a margin of 37 bps for a further 13 associations with an 
all-in cost of funds 3.764% (3.93% with fees) and with a 28 year term. This 
was competitive with other government backed funding although some 
UK Housing Associations are able to raise funds without guarantee for 
similar rates. 
UK Housing 
Association bond 
issues 
UK housing associations have since 1988 raised funds by taking on bank debt 
and by issuing bonds that typically are bought by institutional investors. Bond 
financing – typically priced at a margin over the 10 year gilt rate – has 
expanded post-GFC as a consequence of banks retreating from the long-term 
debt market 
Total bond issuance for 2010-11 was less than £1 bn. In 2011-12 this 
figure rose to £1.5 bn. In 2014 the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) 
reported that the sector’s borrowing facilities in Q3, 2014 totalled 
£74.5bn, 75% of which was bank loans, thus suggesting bond issuance 
plus private placements now stood at £18.6bn. New facilities arranged in 
the quarter totalled £1.7bn with capital market funding, including private 
placements, contributing 73% of the new funding in the quarter.27 
                                                          
26 Fund recipients included Devon & Cornwall Housing Limited (£85 million/887 homes), Hexagon Housing Association £12.5 million/74 homes ; First Wessex £88 million/589 homes; Great 
Places,£50 million/674 homes; Wales and West Housing, £25 million/251 homes; Adactus, £27 million/344 homes; Home group £61 million/642 homes; and Paradigm £65 million/594 homes.  
 
27 HCA Quarterly surveys  
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Initiative  Purpose  Impact 
London Housing 
Bank 
Reflecting the shift in responsibility for government housing funding from 
central government to the Greater London Authority in 2014, details were 
released of a proposed London Housing Bank. The Bank aimed to gear up on 
the finance provided and facilitate the purchase of market homes off-plan 
and to incentivise developments by offering funding guarantees. Future 
funding would come from a range of sources, including the public sector and, 
potentially, institutional investors. 
Under a funding prospectus published in September 2014 the GLA made a 
£200m loan available for intermediate rent to lever in a further £466m of 
investment. In a second round a further £180m loan was made available for 
shared ownership with the aim of raising £1.2bn. 
The two rounds of funding aim to support 4,000 intermediate rental and 
4,000 shared ownership homes. Early indications are positive in terms of 
this getting off the ground and, for example, bidding for the London 
Housing Bank funding for the ‘Intermediate Rent’ product is open until 
early May. Funding allocations will be announced later in the year.  
National Housing 
Trust (NHT) Scotland 
2010 
The Scottish Government, with support from the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT), 
developed the original NHT model for councils and developers. This 
leveraged private sector funding and council borrowing to deliver homes for 
intermediate rent (i.e. with rents pitched between social housing and market 
levels). Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) were set up to do this and 
purchase the homes produced paying between 65% and 70% of an agreed 
purchase price to the developer up-front. This was funded by participating 
councils offering loans to the LLPs in their area. The remaining 30% to 35% of 
the purchase price was contributed by the developer as a mixture of loan 
funding and equity investment. 
By 2014 agreements had been struck with 15 developers for the delivery 
of over 1,250 homes across 10 council areas. Almost 800 homes have 
been completed, with more in the pipeline. 
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2.3.2 Other developments of 
interest  
There have also been developments in sectors 
other than housing with potential 
applicability. By far the largest such activity in 
both the UK and Australia is the government-
led, privately financed boom in infrastructure 
partnerships, especially for transport. Such 
projects are often based on government 
investing directly into a government-owned 
SPV initially and selling off later to private 
financiers on the basis of demonstrated cash 
flows generated by the completed facility. Our 
latest industry consultations reaffirmed that 
forms of infrastructure provision offering 
long-term revenue can be readily financed by 
the institutional sector.  
This position informed the recommendation 
in our previous report that rental housing 
could be presented as an infrastructure-styled 
investment that can offer an acceptable risk-
adjusted investor return from rental revenue 
(Milligan et al. 2013a: 8). As yet, however, the 
more powerful argument has been for 
building investment in transport 
infrastructure, like roads and ports. 
Accordingly, government recognition of 
affordable rental housing supply as 
infrastructure remains to be seen. 
Another recently strong international policy 
trend in housing finance has been greater use 
of government guarantees to attract 
preferred private investment. As set out in 
Box 2 above, UK governments (England and 
Scotland) have shown the way recently in 
innovating around guarantees for provision of 
private and affordable rental housing supply. 
Lawson (2013) reviews the case for 
guarantees and outlines the ways that various 
forms of guarantees have been used to back 
affordable housing financing in seven 
countries.  
There have also been fund raising 
developments in the local government sector 
that could establish a precedent for the 
affordable housing sector, if the latter could 
emulate the quality and scale of assets and 
cash flows that pertain in the former. Local 
government led initiatives include:  
 The UK Municipal Bond Agency.28 This is 
an independent company owned by local 
government shareholders that aims to 
reduce the financing costs of local 
governments through aggregating capital 
market funds (by issuing bonds) and 
sourcing other finance, such as from 
banks, pension funds or insurance 
companies, and offering a first loss 
guarantee. Initial fund raising efforts are 
underway. Councils and their local 
Housing Associations are expected to be 
able to use a share of the funds raised for 
housing developments. Pooling of 
lending requirements by this means 
helps to create the scale that is needed 
to attract institutional investment. 
 A similar model is the New Zealand Local 
Government Funding Agency. 
Established in 2012 this had issued 
NZ$3.7 billion in loans to municipal 
members by end FY 2014 when loan 
costs had reached 15 basis points above 
the government bond rate. 
 A 2014 Auckland City Council announced 
a plan to support fund raising specifically 
for affordable housing supply through 
pooling investor funds and offering a 
NZ$6 million equity funding 
commitment. While initially aimed at 
philanthropic investors, the Auckland 
Housing Bond has demonstration 
potential. An arms-length not-for-profit 
                                                          
28 This builds on the much longer running Swedish 
Kommunivest set up in 1986 
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fund-raising agency is being established 
for the purpose. 
 The Victorian Local Government Funding 
Vehicle (LGFV). Established with 30 local 
council members, 2014 saw their launch 
of a $200 million bond to be sold to a mix 
of domestic and international investors. 
This will enable participating councils to 
replace some of their traditional bank 
borrowings with lower cost debt capital 
markets’ funding. A national collective 
financing authority for local government 
has been recommended for Australia. 
3 INDUSTRY INSIGHTS 
POST-2012  
Investment experts participating in this study 
emphasised the continuing significance of the 
four key barriers to institutional appetite for 
investing in rental housing that were 
identified in our 2012 investigation (see Box 
1). Equally, however, there was growing 
recognition of the problems caused by poor 
housing affordability. While those from 
industry superannuation funds and major 
banks indicated ongoing interest in the issue 
and associated opportunities, several also 
emphasised fatigue and frustration in dealings 
with government, and some previously 
enthusiastic and optimistic informants 
declining to participate in this study. The 
industry mood is summed up by the following 
comments: 
This really started about a year ago …some 
of our funds are very close to their 
members who are now telling them that 
housing has become a big problem 
(interview, industry peak body). 
We’ve spent time getting to know who the 
affordable housing businesses are and how 
the regulation works around these entities 
…With NRAS gone, we’re still talking to 
people about how we might [make an 
investment in rental housing] but are we 
working on any [possible models]? – No… 
It’s been a bit of a frustrating ride really 
because we’ve spent quite a bit of time on 
this…(interview, industry superannuation 
fund investment manager). 
The private sector is still willing to do 
equity and the banks are still willing to do 
debt on the right conditions (interview, 
senior banking official). 
Below we summarise prevailing views on the 
main industry-perceived barriers and possible 
ways of overcoming these as they emerged 
from our latest round of interviews and 
meetings.  
3.1 Risk return equation 
Institutional investors are seeking yields 
comparable with other asset classes (such as 
commercial real estate investment trusts, 
residential mortgage-backed securities) and 
offering predictable (guaranteed) long-term 
returns. Extensive industry modelling 
stimulated by NRAS has demonstrated that, to 
meet affordability goals, risk-adjusted returns 
required by institutional investors (to match 
other investment options) cannot be met 
without a financial incentive to boost returns 
and some form of credit enhancement to 
commensurately reduce risk.  
The government change regarding NRAS 
has severely impaired some of the 
strategies we were looking at …There has 
to be an incentive, whether it’s along the 
lines of NRAS or otherwise, there has to be 
some incentive and there has to be a 
market [for tradeable debt] (interview, 
industry superannuation fund investment 
manager). 
The reluctance of institutional investors to 
take residential development or property risk 
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was also reiterated, along with a viewpoint 
that the superannuation industry may already 
be overexposed to property, such as through 
equities held in development companies and 
(mortgage-issuing) banks.  
From an equity point of view the question 
of an appropriate return for the level of 
risk is far, far more acute than in relation 
to debt (interview, industry 
superannuation fund investment 
manager). 
This is an on-going difficulty where affordable 
housing is perceived by investors as a 
property asset, rather than as a cash flow 
profile. Thus, as first advocated in our 2012 
research, structuring rental housing 
investment on the basis of infrastructure 
financing principles – matching cash flow from 
revenue to a fund’s liabilities over a defined 
period –  should be promoted as the 
preferred way forward because this will best 
convey the lower risk and, thus, lower return 
nature of the product.  
This has specific implications for how 
government policy is shaped to support both 
the construction and operating phases of 
affordable housing provision, as explained in 
more detail in our previous research (Milligan 
et al. 2013a: 45-47). In summary, the strategy 
needs to involve government actions to de-
risk construction (such as site assembly and 
planning support and, perhaps, a revolving 
construction fund for not-for-profit 
developers) and, following investor take-out 
of a portfolio of completed properties, some 
form of subsidy support and possibly revenue 
guarantee to lower investor yield 
expectations. Once a market in residential 
rental dwellings develops and becomes more 
competitive, government could step back 
from some of these provisions.  
3.2 Scale 
While several participating institutional 
investors recognised the attraction of a debt 
product with yield based entirely on rental 
return, problems related to deal size remain.  
Getting scale is also crucial. We wouldn’t 
do anything for less than $150 million 
and as part of diversification while at the 
same time managing any reputational 
risk (interview, industry superannuation 
fund investment manager). 
The Deal size needs to be $50m to $75m 
for an individual large investor and each 
one doesn’t want to own more than 10% 
of the fund. Thus a $1billion investment 
opportunity would be a good starting 
point (interview director, investment 
intermediary). 
For scalable deals to achieve adequate 
returns, governments also need to offer more 
policy consistency, especially as regards 
taxation settings.  
A significant outstanding issue is 
streamlining and standardising tax 
treatment. All [organisation’s] schemes 
have tax avoidance structures which 
require individual rulings (interview, 
senior banking official).  
A key issue for large-scale investors is 
jurisdictional differences in, and the cost 
of, state taxes [stamp duty and land tax] 
(interview, director investment 
intermediary).  
Achievement of investor interest and scale 
will also be assisted by promoting liquidity. A 
forthcoming AHURI report will confirm the 
domestic industry’s desire for effective 
residential property investment vehicles 
designed to suit Australian investment 
conditions (Newell et al. 2015).  
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3.3 Lack of market 
information 
The advent of NRAS resulted in significantly 
increased attention being given by trustees, 
fund managers, investment intermediaries 
and ratings agencies to affordable housing as 
an investment option. However, while 
progress on ‘getting to know’ the affordable 
housing industry was evident, novelty barriers 
persisted:   
The prospect of rental housing investment 
is hard for investors to get their heads 
around because of the greater complexity 
involved in managing an asset seen as 
‘fragmented’ by comparison with a large 
commercial or retail building (interview, 
industry superannuation fund investment 
manager). 
Developing adequate market information is 
one key to overcoming the novelty factor. In 
this regard, an internationally active 
institution compared the Australian market 
situation unfavourably with that of the UK:  
The long running experience with The 
Housing Finance Corporation (UK) as 
aggregator has meant there is a wealth of 
information on performance of 
[residential] assets there (interview 
institutional banking sector). 
3.4 Policy risk 
Changeability and inconsistency of 
government policy continue to be major 
concerns for large investors, as underscored 
by industry dismay at the abandonment, 
rather than continuation and refinement, of 
NRAS.29  
NDIS and state-based initiatives described 
earlier were seen as offering some potential 
                                                          
29 See, for example, Property Council of Australia ‘Don't 
throw the NRAS baby out with the bathwater’, April 28, 
2014.  
to maintain momentum following the loss of 
NRAS. However, one informant described how 
their efforts to develop a product under the 
NDIS had also faltered because the incoming 
Coalition Government had limited client 
packages to 12-months, which resulted in too 
much risk around future revenue streams 
(Interview senior manager institutional 
banking sector). Several participants were also 
critical of the long delay in the release of the 
NDIS housing finance options paper (first 
mooted for late 2013 and but still unpublished 
over 15 months later), reflecting a mood of 
weakened trust in government (and hence 
greater risk).  
For any initiative of this kind where 
government wants a major market response, 
the pervasive view was that government 
should propose a framework and then work 
closely and methodically with industry players 
to understand their requirements and to hone 
workable options. While only in its early days, 
the NSW Premier’s Initiative, discussed above, 
may offer such an approach. However, within 
the constraints imposed by the need for 
commercial confidentiality, an ‘open book’ 
obligation for funded projects would be 
desirable. This could help to establish investor 
requirements (e.g. their risk/return appetite); 
support the development of industry 
information and performance data; increase 
understanding across government and the 
industry of practical requirements for 
affordable housing procurement and long 
term management; and disclose the most cost 
effective options for government support 
(Milligan et al. 2013a: 11).  
3.5 Specific lessons from 
NRAS  
The NRAS experience has provided important 
specific lessons about avoidable missteps in 
the design, implementation and 
administration of a major government 
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initiative aiming to attract institutional 
investment.30 
Its 2008 enabling legislation made it clear that 
NRAS was intended to create a new 
residential asset class for large-scale 
investors.31 In Box 3 we analyse policy design, 
implementation and administrative factors 
that our research suggests were major 
contributors to the institutional sector’s 
restrained engagement with the scheme (thus 
limiting industry ’ownership’ of the program) 
before its 2014 demise. 
Crucial among the shortcomings was the 
policymaker failure to heed industry and 
expert advice that the scheme required a 
major shift in thinking and action by 
governments, non-profit organisations and 
private investors that would need several 
years and a staged approach to achieve.32 
Alongside this, the scheme experienced major 
administrative failings from the Canberra-
based welfare bureaucracy that was ill-
equipped to deliver on its objectives 
especially in the timeframe allowed. These 
included a serious lack of institutional finance 
knowledge and bureaucratic reticence to 
engage with the industry (Milligan & Tiernan 
2011).  
  
                                                          
30 While beyond government’s control, it is also 
important to note that the implementation timeline for 
NRAS was severely disrupted by the advent of the 2007 
GFC and the ensuing credit crunch. 
31 See for example, the Treasurer’s Second Reading 
Speech, National Rental Affordability Scheme 
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2008.  
32 Interview Julian Disney, Chair, National Affordable 
Housing Summit 2004-2011 
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BOX 3: NRAS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 
Opportunities and strengths Threats and weaknesses 
Scale and liquidity 
The size of the scheme (10-year 
incentives for 50,000 new 
rental dwellings) offered 
potential for deals at scale. 
Development of a secondary 
market in NRAS (to achieve 
liquidity) was envisaged by 
scheme advocates. 
The NRAS bidding process involved calls for site specific housing provision. Except 
for Bid Round 4 which specified deals of 1,000 dwellings, NRAS was not structured 
to readily enable scalable deals – whereby large investors could finance large 
amounts of housing at diverse sites to meet specified criteria over several years. 
A further adverse consequence of the tender model used was that small investors 
dominated the bidding, increasing administrative load and delaying decision-
making. 
Insufficient time was allowed for a market in NRAS to develop. Appropriate 
enabling and regulatory arrangements for such a market were slow to develop. In 
the meantime initial trading in NRAS allocations that developed was characterised 
by some as rorting, damaging the public reputation of the scheme. 
Risk return 
The aim of the subsidy was to 
boost the return for investors 
such that affordable housing 
would offer returns comparable 
with alternate investment 
options. 
Major super funds were disadvantaged compared to individual investors and 
SMSFs which could receive the NRAS subsidy on top of ‘negative gearing’ benefits. 
The NRAS ‘tax credit’ model did not match the tax regime of institutional 
investors. Products for packaging the scheme to suit institutional investors took 
significant time and resources to develop and ‘sell’.  
Differences in the ways that state jurisdictions designed and implemented NRAS 
and differences in state property tax regimes reduced potential scale efficiencies 
and increased investor costs. 
Supplementary state support – such as through government land allocations, site 
assembly, planning system support, tax concessions or infrastructure provision – 
did not eventuate at the scale envisaged.  
Leakage of fees to self-appointed intermediaries reduced potential returns to 
investors and value for money for government. 
Institutional investors unfamiliar with the performance of residential assets 
required robust performance information. Indexation of the annual NRAS 
incentive by the rental price index, not the better known CPI, added to 
uncertainty. 
Novelty 
NRAS was intended to create 
the conditions for a new 
domestic residential asset class 
that would be attractive to 
institutional investors. 
There was insufficient effort to promote and tailor NRAS to institutional investors; 
government officials were apparently reluctant to market the scheme to the 
institutional sector.  
Proposed use of a high level independent expert advisory group to inform early 
development of the scheme was not taken up. While the superannuation industry 
undertook extensive due diligence of its own, this took time and thus had yet to 
bear fruit at the time of scheme closure.  
Perceived risk of tenant evictions was nominated by the industry as a major hurdle 
that was not adequately addressed. 
Policy risk 
The Rudd Labor Government 
signalled it would continue with 
NRAS after the first 50,000 
dwellings were supplied. 
Support from the then Coalition 
Opposition was indicated. 
Super funds were concerned about deciding to invest in a new asset class utilising 
NRAS, if this were to turn out as a one-off venture with no predictable trail of 
subsequent investments. The abrupt cessation of NRAS has vindicated this 
concern and set back trust in government.  
There were inconsistencies between states in NRAS-related policy, tax and 
regulatory environments that added to complexity and cost. 
Sources: Interviews; Milligan & Tiernan (2011). 
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4 WAY FORWARD 
Overall since 2012, Australia has seen a step 
change in finance sector awareness of the 
affordable housing industry; its structures, 
functions and remit. This was largely 
stimulated by the ambition and scale of NRAS 
but also to some extent by state government 
redevelopment proposals involving public 
housing land contributions or public private 
partnerships. Several major institutions have 
expended considerable time and money on 
industry familiarisation, product 
development, feasibility studies and 
education of industry players (such as trustees 
and fund managers). As reflected in this 
research, the general industry viewpoint 
remains, as we concluded in 2013, that large-
scale institutional investment in a residential 
asset class is both highly desirable and 
feasible (Milligan et al. 2013a). As 
international experience attests, a switch to 
large scale institutional financing can and 
should work given the right conditions. 
However, bringing this to fruition in Australia 
will require governments to specifically 
address the fundamental barriers discussed in 
this and our earlier research.  
At the same time, the Australian economy is 
badly in need of assurance that the residential 
construction revival, which has helped to 
shield the economy from the end of the 
mining boom, will be maintained. This view 
arises particularly in light of uncertainties 
about the future of many of the factors that 
have contributed to this revival, notably:  
 Post-2011 rapid house price inflation, 
widely considered unsustainable 
 Ongoing record-low interest rates 
 Tax concessions encouraging negative 
gearing and rapid expansion of 
contributions to superannuation funds, 
and 
 Regulations affecting borrowing for 
rental investment both within and 
outside of SMSFs.  
In labour market terms, the recent 
housebuilding revival seen in some parts of 
the country has compensated for the 
downturn in mining and the longer-term 
decline of manufacturing. The potential exists 
for a much more substantial and sustained 
growth in housing-related employment and 
activity if we could overcome the perennial 
problem of the volatility in the current 
sources of investment. As argued by the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank: 
A high level of construction, maintained for 
a longer period of time, is vastly preferable 
to a very sharp boom and bust cycle. That 
alternative outcome might give us a higher 
peak in the near term, but then a slump in 
the housing sector at a time when the fall 
in mining investment is still occurring. A 
sustained period of strong construction will 
be more helpful from the point of view of 
encouraging growth in non-mining activity 
– and also, surely, from a wider 
perspective: housing our growing 
population in an affordable manner 
(Stephens 2014: 5). 
As shown by the success of the economic 
stimulus provided by the Australian 
Government’s 2008 Social Housing Initiative, 
the availability of shovel-ready projects when 
there is a slump and a commitment to ensure 
there is adequate funding, as well as the 
political will to use planning powers to enable 
these projects to go ahead, provides an 
obvious solution to the desire for a sustained 
period of strong construction. 
Nevertheless, in developing a mature 
Australian institutional investment market in 
affordable housing there is still a very long 
way to go. For their part, Australian 
 
 
26 
 
governments must now spur recovery from 
recent reputational damage inflicted on the 
nascent affordable housing asset class, and 
take a stronger and much better-informed 
part in stimulating private funding of 
affordable housing. A much more solid and 
enduring bi-partisan policy platform and 
significantly improved public administration 
will be required as part of the mix for private 
financial institutions to commit to further 
engagement and, ultimately, to make 
defensible investment decisions in this realm. 
While national government leadership would 
be highly desirable, tightly coordinated state 
actions (in order to provide necessary scale 
and market diversity) could possibly 
substitute in the absence of such 
commitment. 
If a strategy to engage institutional investors 
in supplying rental housing is pursued, not 
only will future generations of lower income 
households benefit from having well-located, 
stable and affordable housing but 
governments will have succeeded in 
catalysing a sustainable new model of rental 
housing provision. The model envisaged has 
the potential to attract capital markets 
funding at scale and to bring ongoing benefits 
to the construction industry while, at the 
same time, being less reliant on budget 
outlays and tax expenditures than past or 
current approaches. Professional 
management of rental housing will also be 
stimulated.  
4.1 Recommendations  
Stakeholder interviews conducted for this 
research project have affirmed that the 
directions laid down by the 2012 expert panel 
remain at the heart of what will be required 
to evoke large-scale institutional financing of 
rental housing in Australia. In this final 
section, we revisit the core recommendations 
of that panel (See Milligan et al. 2013a: 9-11 
and Box 1 in this paper) and adapt and update 
those to take account of the subsequent 
policy and market developments, including 
the lessons arising from the NRAS experience 
and advances in overseas practice as outlined 
in the body of the paper.  
1. Given the economic and social 
importance of boosting efficiently and 
effectively managed rental housing 
supply, Governments across Australia 
should recognise the untapped potential 
for large scale institutional investment in 
this sector. They should give priority to 
stimulating a new financing model to 
realise this prospect. 
 
Without doubt institutional investment is 
more likely if there is strong and consistent 
government leadership in this area, preferably 
coordinated at a national level. While a 
number of funds recognise the case for 
investing in housing, they need to be 
confident that the appropriate policy stance is 
going to remain in place for a sustained period 
and that government will work with the 
industry to underpin the development of this 
new market. Achieving scale and national 
policy consistency will be critical to support 
the kinds of risk mitigation that institutional 
players are seeking in what is essentially a 
small and unproven domestic market. The 
prospective White Papers on Reform of the 
Federation and Reform of Australia’s Tax 
System offer immediate opportunities to 
recognise the national interest in achieving a 
transformative breakthrough in financing 
affordable rental housing.  
2. A cross-sectoral Rental Investment Task 
Force of key stakeholders and experts 
with high level policy and financing 
credentials should be appointed to 
develop recommendations for achieving 
target levels of institutional investment 
in rental housing supply, including an 
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element of rentals affordable to low and 
moderate income groups. 
Thinking and activity around institutional 
engagement in Australian housing provision 
remains in its early stages – the arrival of 
NRAS and individual states have advanced the 
agenda but there is much further to go. There 
continues to be a strong case for bringing 
together a time-limited high level task force to 
consolidate what has been learned to date 
across the country, to engage with the 
nascent fund appetite to invest in housing and 
to frame a way forward. Such a high level task 
force would need to be backed by a 
specialised high profile senior officials group 
which can then progress the detail of this in 
collaboration with both the finance industry 
and the housing sector. Crucially, because of 
the complex and cross-cutting nature of the 
issues and challenges, this group should be 
located in a central agency of government 
(e.g. Treasury), not in a welfare department.  
3. An eminent private sector leader should 
be appointed to head the Rental 
Investment Task Force. 
Identifying a respected and dedicated high 
profile individual to lead the task force and 
champion the case for institutions to develop 
rental housing portfolios remains highly 
desirable to help resolve political and industry 
barriers and widen support for appropriate 
action, in a similar way to how championing of 
the NDIS occurred.  
4. To facilitate the supply of newly-
constructed affordable rental housing, a 
new incentive framework designed 
specifically for institutional players (and 
replacing the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme) should be 
developed for introduction by 2017 
The Rental Investment Task Force should be 
charged with developing design guidelines for 
a new incentive suited to the institutional 
sector to be introduced from 2017. This would 
be designed specifically to reduce the returns 
required by institutional investors to levels 
commensurate with the development of a 
competitive market in affordable rental 
provision. At the same time, the rental 
housing investment officials group (see above) 
should give specific consideration to how the 
costs of such an incentive could be offset 
through adjustments elsewhere - e.g. through 
limitation of negative gearing provisions or 
landlord capital gains tax concessions.  
5. State Governments should assemble and 
offer an initial portfolio of suitable 
shovel ready sites for residential 
development by private and not-for-
profit developers which, on letting, can 
be re-financed through large-scale 
institutional investment.  
The aim of this demonstration should be to 
create scalable opportunities for institutional 
investors and build confidence in the future of 
this asset class. The preferred starting model 
would be for government or not-for-profits to 
retain ownership of the land and to on-sell to 
institutional investors the cash flows from 
rental revenues for an agreed term (10 -20 
years). Site assembly should not be limited to 
public housing areas. Developments should 
include but not be limited to affordable 
housing. Packaging opportunities across (at 
least two) jurisdictions would increase the 
scale and attractiveness of any offer – as 
diversified deals worth around a $1billion will 
be required. Joint efforts should also be made 
to reduce cross-jurisdictional differences (in 
planning and tax policy for instance) that add 
to costs. 
6. State governments should offer a land 
tax waiver for aggregated rental holdings 
meeting designated regulatory 
requirements for affordable rental.  
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Providing a land tax concession for aggregated 
affordable rental portfolios – consistent with 
the concession currently available to small 
investors – will level the playing field for, and 
reduce the costs of, institutional financing. 
7. Consideration should be given to the 
possible role of government guarantees 
in facilitating institutional investment in 
rental housing provision, to provide 
comfort to backers and, thus, to 
minimise cost of funds. 
By international standards, deals for financing 
affordable housing in Australia have been too 
expensive so far. Key contributory factors 
include revenue risk and, related to this 
concern or otherwise, default hazard. The 
Senior Officials Group in consultation with the 
Rental Investment Task Force should be 
tasked with specifying how affordable housing 
rental revenue streams could be underpinned. 
This includes giving consideration to how such 
revenue flows could be ‘guaranteed’ for a 
limited period to reduce investment risk and 
perceptions of risk, (thereby lowering the cost 
of funds), pending the evolution of an 
established market in this asset class. This 
issue should also be identified as a key matter 
in forthcoming deliberations on welfare 
reform. Additionally, the Group should also be 
asked to evaluate the possible benefits and 
costs to government contingent on 
implementation of a rental investment debt 
guarantee mechanism.  
8. An independent specialist financial 
intermediary, such as an Australian 
Housing Finance Corporation, should be 
founded.  
As argued in more detail in Lawson et al. 
(2014), the purposes for such an intermediary 
include: growing specialised institutional 
knowledge of finance market requirements; 
building trusted relationships between 
housing providers and investors; aggregating 
the borrowing requirements of diverse 
housing providers; administering contestable 
allocation processes; and providing quality 
information on investment performance. Such 
a development would emulate successful 
international practice as, for example, 
demonstrated by The Housing Finance 
Corporation, the UK’s long-established not-
for-profit institution playing this role.  
9. An existing or new agency should be 
resourced to collect, publish and 
maintain appropriate financial, asset and 
tenancy management information that 
will inform all industry parties about the 
state of the affordable housing industry 
and its development.  
Up-to-date information on financial deal 
terms, asset portfolios and tenancy 
performance is essential to inform the 
industry about this new investment class and 
to overcome perceived risks and novelty 
barriers. Reinstating analysis of housing 
market supply and demand (for example, as 
provided by the former National Housing 
Supply Council between 2008 and 2013) 
would also help to bolster investor interest. 
Collection and publication of such data under 
interim arrangements should commence as 
soon as possible with a view to reallocating 
the responsibility as the institutional context 
for the new market becomes established. 
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10. Tax reform options to support 
institutional investment in social 
infrastructure, including affordable 
housing, should be investigated.  
Beyond specific tax changes discussed above 
and in the context to the White Paper on Tax 
Reform, there is a case for a broader 
investigation into the implications of tax 
arrangements for institutions and what 
changes are desirable to encourage socially 
directed investments, such as affordable 
housing. Pending longer term reform, an 
initial aim could be to level the playing field 
with the tax settings benefitting individual 
investors and SMSFs through negative 
gearing.
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